Introduction
Chapter 3 of this volume describes the ascending proxy auction mechanism of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) , and presents its proven desirable economic properties. However, major obstacles arise in its practical implementation. The primary implementation obstacles are that the mechanism requires a bidder explicitly to enumerate all combinations of interest (for more on communications requirements, see chapter 11 of this volume), and that the mechanism theoretically assumes very small incremental increases in the minimum acceptable bid prices for each of the proxy rounds. This chapter is concerned with the calculation of the final price calculation without the need to perform all of the calculations associated with a direct implementation of the ascending proxy algorithm, as the number of rounds that would be required to complete such a direct implementation would be very large when a high level of accuracy is desired. For example, using an increment of $1,000 in a simulated auction of only ten bidders and six licenses where the auction terminated at about $3.5 million (starting at initial prices of $0), the total number of rounds in the ascending proxy auction was often over 3,000. Yet, without very small incremental increases in prices, many of the proven properties of the ascending proxy auction may not hold. This chapter presents the testing and analysis done on various suggested methods to accelerate the ascending proxy auction without losing its desired economic properties. Each of the methods discussed in the chapter assume that bidders have enumerated all combinations of interest.
Section 17.2 outlines the ascending proxy auction mechanism, provides the notation and definitions of properties that are essential to understanding the characteristics of the core outcomes of the ascending proxy auction, and presents observations of various properties of the mechanism. Section 17.3 summarizes three prior approaches to accelerating the ascending proxy auction suggested by Wurman, Cai, Zhong, and Sureka (2003) , Parkes (2003) , and Ausubel (2003) ; we conclude section 17.3 with a short description of Parkes' direct method (Parkes 2003) for calculating buyer-optimal core outcomes.
Section 17.4 presents three new approaches for accelerating the ascending proxy auction. The first approach works backwards from the efficient outcome using the concept of ''safe'' prices. This approach is referred to as ''safe start.'' The second approach starts with a very large increment, runs the ascending proxy auction to completion, and then iteratively reduces the increment by a factor of ten, repeating the process until prices are calculated to a specified tolerance. This second algorithm is referred to as ''increment scaling.'' The third approach combines the safe-start and incrementalscaling algorithms and is referred to as ''increment scaling with safe start.'' The number of combinatorial optimization problems needed to achieve the efficient outcome with this combined approach is considerably fewer than any of the other approaches described in the chapter. In addition, this algorithm is capable of providing prices to any specified accuracy.
Section 17.5 presents several propositions that characterize the outcomes implemented by the proposed safe-start increment-scaling algorithm for speeding up the ascending proxy calculations and presents bounds on the computational requirements. Section 17.5 and the appendix present several examples to illustrate the outcomes of the various approaches. Finally, the chapter contains conclusions and recommendations for further research.
Background
This section contains a brief overview of the ascending proxy auction mechanism, definitions necessary to understand the outcomes of the auction, and observations of the various properties of the auction.
Mechanism Overview
Chapter 2 of this volume describes iterative ascending mechanisms, and chapter 3 provides a complete description of the ascending proxy mechanism. In chapter 2, Ausubel and Milgrom demonstrate that the ascending proxy mechanism converges to a core outcome with straightforward bidding. This auction mechanism converges to the VCG outcome when the buyer submodularity 1 condition holds and the authors show that semisincere equilibrium can be achieved even when this condition does not hold. When one incorporates Parkes and Ungar's (2000a) iBundle (3) with a proxy mechanism, the design is exactly that Ausubel and Milgrom describe in chapter 3. The main thrust of this chapter is to show how the price allocations of that mechanism can be computed without requiring the computation of each round of proxy bidding. We first summarize the basic design aspects of the ascending proxy auction:
1. Each bidder provides a value at the beginning of the auction for each of their desired packages. a. Bidders cannot revise the values they provided at the beginning of the auction. b. Each bidder's valuation vector assumes a quasi-linear utility function, i.e., the change in utility of a package is proportional to the magnitude of the change in value for that package. c. Each bidder's valuation vector assumes free disposal, i.e., there is no cost in receiving additional items at zero prices. 2. All packages of a bidder are considered mutually exclusive, thus a bidder can win at most one of its bids. 3. All bidders are forced to bid in a straightforward manner through a proxy bidding agent. 4. The auction progresses through a series of proxy bidding rounds and ends when no proxy agent places new bids. 5. In a proxy bidding round, the following events occur: a. Each proxy agent of a nonprovisionally winning bidder computes the current profit for each desired package of the bidder. Profit is defined as the difference between the value that the bidder has placed on the package and the price that the auctioneer has currently set for the package. At the beginning of the auction, the price of every package is set to epsilon. The auctioneer raises the price of each nonwinning bid by a very small amount each round. b. Each proxy agent of a nonprovisionally winning bidder then submits a bid at the current price on the bidder's package with the maximum profit. If more than one package has the maximum profit, bids are submitted on all such packages at the current price. c. The auctioneer then takes all bids placed thus far in the auction and determines a set of provisionally winning bids such that revenue is maximized subject to the restrictions that each item is awarded at most once and that all bids of a bidder are mutually exclusive. The first solution found by the optimization software is the one used, i.e., there is no separate mechanism for choosing among ties. d. New prices are calculated for each nonwinning package. In both the Parkes and Ungar (2000b) (iBundle (3)) auction and the Ausubel-Milgrom design, the price for a package is calculated by adding a fixed small increment, e, to the highest previous bid amount placed on the package by the bidder. If the bidder has not previously bid on the package, the increment is added to the opening price for that package. Note that prices are non-anonymous, i.e., in any round of the auction the price for a given bundle is bidder specific. The Wurman-Wellman design, by contrast, formulates a linear program in each round to determine nonlinear, anonymous prices for the next round. 6. All bids are firm offers. A bidder can never reduce the bid amount of a bid submitted by its proxy agent or withdraw the bid.
7. The auction ends when there are no new bids. At the end of the auction, the provisionally winning bids become the winning bids of the auction.
Because all nonwinning bids are incremented by a fixed small epsilon amount each round, all nonwinning bidders will increase their bid by epsilon on all bids already made, until these bids are no longer profitable. New bids may be added to the set of ''myopic best response'' bids when they tie the current set. At some point, a proxy agent will no longer bid for that bidder because the prices on all of the packages of interest are greater than the valuations for those packages. Because all bids remain in the system throughout the auction, one of the already placed bids may become a winning bid. Because a winning bidder will have the price increased by epsilon on all bids except his winning bid, all bids other than this winning bid will have profitability less than the already placed winning bid. The proxy will therefore submit no new bids for this bidder until the current winning bid is no longer winning.
Limiting the bidders to straightforward myopic bidding restricts signaling, parking, and other strategic opportunities that can have negative effects on auction efficiency. Similar to a sealed-bid Vickrey auction, bidders have incentives to reveal the true relative values of the different combinations of items they wish to obtain. In its purest form, the effort required to compute the final allocation and the winning prices in a proxy bidding auction requires that the auctioneer run a forward auction with very small bid increments, computing the provisionally winning bidders in each round by solving a combinatorial optimization problem.
Definitions
We provide some definitions and well-known characterizations of the ascending proxy auctions in this section. Throughout this chapter we will use the following notation: A is the set of all agents with a A A an agent. The set of winning bidders is denoted as A Ã , the value of package S to agent a is denoted as v a ðSÞ, and wðAÞ is the value of the winner determination problem when the valuations on the packages are used as the objective function coefficients.
Free disposal: Proxy mechanisms assume the property of free disposal. That is, any agent's value on any superset of items, S, is at least as great as his value for a set T J S. In other words, there is no cost in receiving additional items at zero prices.
Competitive equilibrium: An allocation, S, prices, p, and valuations v, are in competitive equilibrium if and only if the following two conditions hold:
where S a represents a's package in the allocation S, and X denotes the space of feasible allocations. That is, ðS; pÞ is at competitive equilibrium if allocation S maximizes the payoffs for all agents including the seller, at the prices, p.
See chapters 1 and 3 of this volume for definitions of VCG mechanism, payoffs, and payments. For these VCG payoffs to have desired properties in a combinatorial auction, the ''agents-are-substitutes'' property must be satisfied. We define this property next. Agents-are-substitutes (AAS): Based on bidder preferences, this is a condition whereby the following holds for all coalitions of bidders:
The AAS condition is a necessary condition for the VCG payments to be supported in the core, and for the existence of a unique buyer-optimal core payoff vector. However, this is not a sufficient condition for an ascending proxy auction to terminate with VCG payments. For this to occur, the stronger condition of buyer submodularity must hold. Buyer submodularity (BSM): The condition of buyer submodularity requires that the VCG payoff is in the core for all subcoalitions that include the seller:
where L represents subcoalitions of all agents, A, that include the seller. This stronger condition is sufficient for truthful, straightforward bidding and for an ascending proxy auction to terminate with the unique buyer Pareto-dominant Vickrey outcome. Pareto-dominant allocation: An allocation, x 0 , is said to Pareto-dominate an allocation,
x, if every agent prefers x 0 to x. A buyer Pareto-dominant allocation is one where every winning bidder prefers x 0 to x.
If the VCG outcome is in the core, then it is a buyer Pareto-dominant allocation. Also, the core contains the buyer Pareto-dominant point if and only if the VCG payment is in the core (theorem 6, Ausubel and Milgrom 2002) .
Failure of BSM condition could result in a winning bidder paying more than the VCG payment, by following a straightforward bidding strategy in an ascending proxy auction. In this chapter, we will present a method, which we label the safe-start increment-scaling implementation, that will end with VCG payoffs whenever the AAS condition holds, regardless of whether the BSM condition holds.
When the AAS condition does not hold, the VCG payoff vector may not be in the core. In this case, truthful bidding is not an equilibrium strategy. Parkes et al. (2001) proposed a threshold scheme to use when no such unique Pareto-dominant core outcome exists. This scheme is based on Parkes' studies of the incentive properties of allocations, and essentially minimizes the maximum deviation of payoffs from the VCG payoffs. Payment allocation using this scheme minimizes the bidder's freedom to manipulate the outcome of the bargaining problem by misstating valuations. For more on the price-based allocations, see chapter 2 of this volume.
Observations
In this section, we explain how a straightforward implementation of this mechanism allows for inefficiencies that may result in a solution that, although in the core, could result in payments to the seller that are larger than the Pareto-optimal payments. This inefficiency is due to the nature of the competition the bidders experience in each round and due to the effect of the size of the increment on the prices paid at the close of the auction.
Competition Induced Inefficiencies The adjustment process in the ascending proxy auction requires that the payoff profile is unblocked in every round; that is, in every round, a bidder is forced to bid an increment higher every time he is not in a winning coalition in that specific round, due to the straightforward bidding strategy. However, some of these winning coalitions in the early rounds cannot be sustained as the prices rise above the valuations of these bidders, and they eventually stop bidding. Such competition in the early rounds results in convergence to a point in the core that may not be buyer Pareto-dominant; that is, straightforward bidding strategy forces the prices higher than the minimum required for winning. This is due to the failure of the BSM condition, according to which the marginal contribution of a specific bidder in a coalition decreases with the size of the coalition. In the process that we describe, we have eliminated this unnecessary competition by first determining an efficient allocation, and therefore both the set of winning and losing bidders, respectively. We then place all bids of losing bidders at their valuations and determine the competition that may exist between these losing bids of nonwinning bidders and all bids of winning bidders.
Increment-Induced Inefficiencies A practical implementation of an ascending proxy auction requires the specification of a bid increment that is sufficiently larger than the theoretical requirement for small 'e'. However, this larger increment size can result in two kinds of inefficiencies:
1. The winning bidder might end up paying significantly more than the minimum required to win. 2. A package may get assigned to a bidder who values it less than a losing bidder. This could happen if the increment applied to a standing bid by an agent makes the new minimum acceptable bid amount higher than the maximum valuation on the package. The agent with a lower valuation on the same package, but with a current high standing bid, wins.
Prior Approaches to Accelerating Proxy Auctions
In this section, we describe three approaches previously proposed to accelerate the ascending proxy mechanism. Each of these approaches involves identifying inflection points that define the path of convergence to final prices, and using the information to adjust prices while avoiding the small incremental steps. Identifying these defining inflection points could be computationally challenging and the number of such points could be exponential, depending on the number of items and agents in an auction. Thus, it is unlikely these approaches are scalable. However, they do provide insight and understanding of the nature of competition among coalitions in an ascending proxy mechanism and demonstrate an improvement in required computational effort over the pure ascending proxy implementation. We end this section with a short description of an approach, proposed by Parkes (2003) , that considers the core conditions directly to arrive at the prices obtained by the accelerated proxy method. Wurman, Cai, Zhong, and Sureka (2003) plotted the change in the prices of each bid of each bidder throughout the course of the ascending proxy auction and noticed that for many rounds of the auction, the prices progress in a steady fashion. At certain points, however, the rate at which the package prices increase changes. They noticed that these inflection points occur when some bidder (a) adds a package to the packages that he is currently bidding on-that is, the point at which the profit (value-price) of this new package is equal to the profit that he could obtain on his current set of package bids, or (b) when a bidder drops out of the auction (equivalent to the bidder submitting a null bid because nothing is profitable) and (c) when an allocation that was not competitive becomes competitive.
Wurman et al.'s Inflection Point Approach
Wurman et al.'s algorithm partitions time into intervals during which the demand sets for all agents remain constant. They then calculate a trajectory of the price of a given package in the interval, and from that calculate the next point in time at which an inflection in the package's trajectory will occur. They call a point at which an agent will change his trajectory a collision point. Looking among all agents, they find the first collision point. At each collision point, a mixed-integer optimization is solved and new slopes are computed.
In addition to considering bidders separately, the algorithm must compute the proportion of time that a bidder is winning/nonwinning so that it can determine the length of the noncollision interval. To determine when a bid can be part of a winning coalition, the algorithm must maintain information about the set of feasible coalitions. They hypothesize that the algorithm does not need to consider all such feasible coalitions, but only the single best allocation for any given coalition of agents.
Agents in an ascending auction will place new bids whenever they have no winning bids, and pass otherwise. Thus, agents that are not part of the winning allocation will continue to increase their bids on already bid packages and may also add additional packages to their demand set, at the point where such bids become as profitable as those already bid. One must therefore compute when a new item will be added to the set, as well as determine the most profitable coalition for each package of each bidder. In addition, one must know the allocations that will compete with this coalition. One can then use this information to determine the inflection points at which a new coalition becomes competitive with the existing coalitions. This information is also sufficient to determine the prices at these inflection points. At the last inflection point, one has obtained the competitive prices. Wurman, Zhong, and Cai (2004) extend the above work to cases where an arbitrary number of bundles can be added to the demand sets and where several allocations become competitive simultaneously. In these cases, one must worry that bundles that were previously in the demand sets may be dropped and that there are more alternative coalitions to consider. Their auction rules differ from the Ausubel and Milgrom auction rules in that in the Wurman, Zhong, and Cai (2004) paper, a bidder randomly selects one element in its demand set on which to bid, whereas in the Ausubel and Milgrom design, bidders raise their offers on all elements of the best-response set. The authors provide an example that we use in the test cases discussed in section 17.5.
The authors acknowledge that they have not yet studied the computational complexity of the process. Rather than solving the standard winner determination problem, they must instead compute the allocation of attention by calculating the interval computations as comparisons between all combinations of elements in the set and those not in the set. Clearly, as problems increase in size, such calculations can increase dramatically. It is also hard to make a comparison on computational effort because the mixed-integer linear program that they solve is very different from the winner determination problems that we must solve. Our winner determination problem has the ''nice'' structure of a set-partitioning problem, and may be significantly easier to solve.
We do not present any direct comparisons with the Wurman et al. algorithm, because we have not coded that algorithm. We do know that the computational effort required by the algorithm is dependent on:
9 The number of items in the demand set for each agent 9 The number of collision points among all agents 9 The number of relevant feasible allocations 9 The number of times such competitive allocations collide. Parkes (2002 Parkes ( , revised 2003 proposed a staged implementation of the ascending proxy auction. The basic idea involves identifying the subset of coalitions that contribute to price competition in an ascending auction, and implementing the ascending phase in stages, where each stage involves a competing set of active coalitions. A coalition is considered active if every agent in the coalition has its bundle or package in its best response set. The price changes in a stage are computed as the maximal price changes that (a) retain the best response sets of agents and (b) retain competition between all active coalitions. The end of a stage is triggered when a coalition drops out of the active set. This coalitional structure enables large, discrete increments in seller revenue in each stage. The two steps involved in this accelerated implementation are:
Parkes' Indirect Implementation of Core Outcomes
Step 1. The first step is to compute the interesting coalitions and the interesting packages for each agent. The set of interesting coalitions, C Ã , are those subcoalitions of agents that might be involved in dynamic price competition during the auction. Parkes defines a recursive combinatorial algorithm to construct the sets of interesting coalitions. Let T i denote the set of interesting packages of agent i that correspond with a coalition x A C Ã , with i A x. For every singleton coalition fig, the interesting bundle is max S v i ðSÞ. Reduced valuations are determined for agents. This reduced valuation function is just an XOR valuation defined over an agent's values for packages in its interesting set.
Step 2. The second step of the staged proxy implementation involves the following computations: a. At the beginning of each stage, t b 1, agent i has a current payoff, p t i , which is initially p 1 o ¼ 0 for the seller, and p
, labeled the ''best response set for agent i at round t, denote the set of packages that are most profitable for agent at the stage t. This is computed as
Initially, this best response set includes only the bundle with maximal value, but as payoffs decrease this set monotonically increases. Let d t i denote the best response slack for agent i at the start of stage t. This is computed as
The slack is therefore the maximal possible decrease in p t i that will leave the agent's best response set unchanged. An agent is active in stage t while d t i > 0. Otherwise, the agent is facing prices that are equal to its value on all packages. b. Given the best response information, each stage of this accelerated mechanism is implemented as an LP. Let k index into the interesting coalitions C Ã , and let C t denote the set of indices for active coalitions at the start of stage t. These are the coalitions for which all packages are receiving bids and also have at least one agent still active. All dominated coalitions are pruned from C t , where x is dominated by any x 0 I x. Given the active coalitions in a stage, the LP is formulated with decision variables, x ¼ fx k : k A C t g, where x k b 0 is the bidding share for active coalition k, and interpreted as the minimal drop in payoff to agents bidding in coalition k during the stage. The LP formulation is
Subject to:
where agent i bids, bid t ðk; iÞ, in coalition k during stage t if there is at least one other active coalition that does not include the agent. The objective is to find the payoff changes that maximize the minimal adjusted revenue across all active coalitions. The LP is solved iteratively to break ties so that all active coalitions have the same adjusted revenue. c. Finally, at the end of the stage, the agent payoffs are adjusted as follows:
The auctioneer's revenue is updated to p tþ1 o , the objective value of [STAGE] .
The next stage of the auction is initialized by updating the myopic best response bid sets, the myopic best response slack values, and the active coalitions. The auction terminates when all remaining active agents are included in the same (and active) coalition. The outcome in the final stage is implemented and the agent payments are based on their payoffs in the final stage. The semidirect proxy auction exactly implements the iBundle and Ausubel-Milgrom proxy outcomes. The complexity of these calculations is dependent on the computation needed to identify the interesting coalitions and the interesting packages for each agent. The set of interesting coalitions, C Ã , are those subcoalitions of agents that might be involved in dynamic price competition during the auction. There may be an exponential number of such coalitions, and thus the algorithm may not be computationally feasible for large auctions. No computational studies have taken place for this approach.
Ausubel's Method for Accelerating Ascending Proxy Auction
Ausubel (2003) also identified that the size of the bid increment should only affect the efficiency at moments in the bidding when change events occur. He refers to change events as moments in the bidding when a bidder begins bidding on a new package and when a bidder stops bidding on all packages because the proxy's set of profitable bids is empty. Ausubel notes that when the bidding is not close to a change event it can proceed with very large bid increments, at essentially no cost. However, when the bidding is approaching a change event, the bid increment should be reduced to a very small epsilon, to avoid the inefficiencies and revenue losses of large increments. After the bidding goes past a change event, the bid increments can be drastically increased again until bidding again approaches another change event. Because these change events are determined by the valuations provided, the auction system can switch on and off between very large bid increments and very small bid increments, depending on whether or not there exists a bidder who is approaching a change event.
The other issue to model, as it relates to change events, is the determination of when a bidder must raise his bid prices, that is, when the bidder no longer has a winning package in a given round. If one can identify a repeating cycle of events where within a cycle one can predict the sequence of bids that will win in each round, then one can also use larger increments during this entire cycle. Ausubel also notes that not all ''change events'' are consequential. A change event is consequential only if a bidder introduces a new positive bid and if the new bid becomes a provisionally winning bid. Hence, in a situation where the provisionally winning bids are cycling, the auction system can use the following procedure: Allow the bidder to introduce the new bid and re-compute the solutions to the optimization problems for one full cycle. If the new bid never becomes a provisional winner during this cycle, then the change event was inconsequential. In this case, the previously identified cycle will continue to hold, and the auction system can revert to not computing the solution to the optimization problem. However, if the new bid becomes a provisional winner sometime during the cycle, then the change event was consequential, and a new cycling pattern needs to be identified.
In order to implement this approach, one needs to determine the coalitions that impact the cycle of solutions. The challenge is to identify these ''interesting'' coalitions without incurring too much computation cost. In a large auction, the potential exists for the method to encounter an exponential number of such interesting coalitions. Little computational study has been done to determine how to implement these ideas.
Alternative Approaches
We note that each of the approaches described above are implementations to replicate exactly the end results of a proxy auction and mirror the significant change points that occur during that auction. They therefore simulate the bargaining problem that occurs whenever the BSM condition does not hold. As an alternative, Parkes in the same paper as the indirect approach (Parkes 2002 (Parkes , revised 2003 proposes a direct mechanism for obtaining core outcomes without simulating any auction rounds. He first provides an optimization problem that directly determines the buyer-optimal core prices. He labels this the ''buyer-optimal core problem.'' He then uses an observation similar to that which we use in our semidirect approach, namely that the only coalitions that need to be considered are coalitions for subsets of winners. He also shows that many of the ''core'' constraints among winning coalitions are dominated by other core constraints and need not be explicitly provided to the optimization problem. This second observation is used to define an algorithm for constructing the core constraints needed in the buyer-optimal core problem. He acknowledges that the computational properties of this direct implementation are untested. Future research should determine the size of the problem each of the approaches described above is capable of handling.
Near-Direct Implementations of Proxy Auction
We now present new algorithms that have all of the attributes of the Ausubel-Milgrom algorithm, but speed up the calculations and improve the prices obtained. We begin by summarizing our assumptions.
We assume that bidders supply a maximum bid amount for all packages they are interested in winning. These bids can have overlapping items, and can have superadditive, additive or subadditive valuations. All bids of a bidder will be treated as mutually exclusive; each bidder can win at most one bid. Our assumptions are consistent with those made by Ausubel-Milgrom in their ascending proxy implementation:
1. Bidders are free to make as many mutually exclusive bids as they wish. 2. Each bidder has private valuations for the items being auctioned (each bidder knows the value of each good and this valuation does not change with information about other bidders willingness to pay). 3. Bidders have quasi-linear utility values without externalities (thereby limiting the bidders' payoffs to be linear in money). 4. Free disposal (i.e., there is no cost in receiving additional items at zero price). 5. Bidders have agreed to have proxy agents bid on their behalf in a straightforward manner.
In this section we propose some relatively easy to implement near-direct ascending implementations that when combined avoid the excessive number of rounds specified by a direct implementation of the Ausubel-Milgrom design. We assure that the allocation is (a) efficient, (b) in the core, and (c) accurate to whatever precision the auctioneer prescribes. When the AAS condition holds, we also show that the prices we obtain are buyer Pareto-dominant VCG payments.
We begin by describing an implementation that accelerates the ascending auction by first determining the efficient outcome and then using this information to jump start the auction at prices that are both ''safe'' and close to the final prices. We then present an alternative implementation that uses ideas of increment scaling, similar to that proposed by Bertsekas (1992) and Bertsekas and Castanon (1992) for solving network problems via an auction mechanism. Finally, we merge these two ideas into a combined safe-start increment-scaling algorithm.
Safe Start
This algorithm exploits the fact that we have complete knowledge of each agent's valuation vector. These valuations can be used to determine the set of winning bidders in the efficient solution. Thus, by solving the winner determination problem using the agent valuation vectors, we can divide the bidders into two sets: the winning and losing bidders, respectively. We can then determine nontrivial starting prices 2 for each bid of each bidder. Such starting prices can greatly reduce the number of rounds that are necessary to implement core outcomes.
We first present the concept of a ''safe start.'' At the conclusion of the ascending proxy auction, all nonwinning agents have zero profitability. Consequently, each agent in the efficient allocation must bid at least as much as the highest value of any nonwinning agent on his allocated package. This nonwinning high value establishes a safe price for the winning agent's allocated package and can subsequently be used to determine the winning agent's initial profitability and price vector. We argue, similarly, that the initial price vector for every nonwinning agent can be set equal to its valuation vector. We describe this algorithm in further detail below.
Step 1. Solve for the efficient allocation The efficient allocation is determined by solving the winner determination problem using the complete set of agent valuation vectors. The solution to this problem allows each agent to be categorized as either winning or nonwinning.
Step 2. Initialization step The bid increment is set to a user-specified required accuracy and all valuations are rounded (down) to that accuracy.
Step 3. Determine safe prices For each package in the efficient allocation, the safe price is determined by finding the maximal valuation on that package from all nonwinning agents. We call this the safe price of the package, denoted s Ã a . Alternatively, one can obtain better safe prices by calculating the Vickrey prices for the winning packages. When the AAS condition holds, the prices obtained are the buyer Pareto-optimal prices. When this property is not satisfied, the Vickrey price may not be in the core and will be lower than the buyer Pareto-optimal prices. Regardless, the Vickrey prices are very good prices with which to start the algorithm. 3 When there are only a few winning bids, we calculate the Vickrey price for each bidder's winning bid and use these prices as our safe start prices. When there are many winning bids, we calculate Vickrey prices only on the larger winning packages, because it is these packages that are likely to not satisfy the AAS condition.
Step 4. Calculate each agent's initial profitability For each winning agent profitability, p a is calculated as the difference between their valuation and the safe price of their winning package, where p a ¼ v a À s Ã a . Every nonwinning agent has an initial profitability of zero.
Step 5. Create initial price vectors The price of every other package for this bidder is set so that the profitability of all packages will be equal to p a . Thus, p i ¼ v i À p a , where i is some nonwinning package of winning bidder a. Each losing bidder's initial price vector is equal to his valuation vector.
Step 6. Execute the ascending proxy auction The ascending proxy auction starts with the initial price vector.
When valuation information is richly defined, the safe-start algorithm provides significant runtime improvements. Simulations have shown that auctions that had run up to two hours could be executed within two minutes by using the safe-start algorithm. Furthermore, this algorithm can eliminate some of the dynamic competition that often leads to outcomes that are not buyer Pareto-dominant due to competition between winning and losing bidders that takes place prior to the losing bidders leaving the auction.
Increment Scaling
One of the greatest challenges to the practical implementation of the ascending proxy auction is finding an acceptable balance between the size of the increment that is used and the runtime that is necessary to execute the auction. We have observed that as the increment is decreased linearly the runtime grows exponentially. However, by iteratively executing the ascending proxy auction with smaller increments, 4 using the outcome of one execution as the basis for the next, it is possible greatly to improve the overall runtime and still implement core outcomes. Furthermore, by applying some corrective measures to this scaled-increment algorithm it is also possible to counteract the increment-induced inefficiencies.
The increment-scaling algorithm attempts to exploit the known properties of the final allocation of the ascending proxy auction to provide a near-optimal starting point for a subsequent iteration. Specifically, all nonwinning agents are at zero profitability and are thus, at best, within one increment of becoming a winning agent. For all winning agents a possibility exists of having bid above that which is necessary. 5 We therefore reduce the current prices for all winning agents by an amount equal to the increment, and maintain the current prices for all nonwinning agents. These new prices provide a starting point for the subsequent iteration of the ascending proxy auc-tion where the increment has been scaled down, in our examples, by a factor of ten. This process continues until the increment is reduced to within a desired threshold. We describe this algorithm in further detail below.
Step 1. Initialize the ascending proxy auction The ''increment threshold'' is set equal to the user-supplied accuracy specified. Thus, it is equivalent to the epsilon increment set in step 1 of the safe-start algorithm. The starting increment for the auction (a much larger increment than this epsilon) is set based on the order of magnitude of the valuations submitted. The auction is provided the trivial starting point.
Step 2. Execute the ascending proxy auction Provided the starting point, the ascending proxy auction is executed until a final outcome is achieved. All packages whose profits lie within the range of the current increment size are submitted in each round. This is achieved by rounding the valuations to the current increment, thus insuring equal profitability for all packages within the range of the current increment.
Step 3. Evaluate the final outcome
Step 3.1. Check if the current increment satisfies the increment threshold. If the increment threshold has been met the increment scaling algorithm terminates, else continue to step 3.2.
Step 3.2. Determine the starting point for the next iteration. Every winning agent's price vector is set equal to their final bid amount in step 2, less the amount of the current increment. Every nonwinning agent's price vector is set equal to his prior bid amount. Go to step 3.3.
Step 3.3. Scale down the current increment. Scale down the current increment by a factor of ten, and return to step 2.
This algorithm always implements a core outcome, but is subject to incrementinduced inefficiencies caused by some winning bidder not being able to meet the increment required at some stage. Thus, another winning bidder may make up the difference and will therefore pay more than his fair share. Interestingly, it is possible to recognize when inefficiencies arise during the evaluation of the final outcome from any iteration. As a result, corrective measures can be employed to eliminate the inefficiencies before proceeding to the subsequent iteration.
Corrective Rollback When winning bids exist in the final outcome of any iteration at a value equal to that agent's starting price on that package and that agent was winning at the conclusion of the prior iteration, then that agent continues to be in a position where he may have overbid. This can be corrected by returning to the starting point of the current iteration and reducing the price vector of the over-extended agent by an amount equal to the prior iteration's increment. This modified starting point is then used to rerun the current iteration. This process continues until the current iteration arrives at an outcome where no agent has been over-extended. The process of adjusting the current iteration's starting point is called a corrective rollback. The maximum number of rollbacks possible is equal to the number of digits of precision required. The algorithm changes only in step 3, where the corrective rollback is now step 3.1.
Step 3.1. Outcome evaluated for agent overextension. If an agent is winning a bundle in the final outcome at the starting price from the current iteration and that agent was winning at the conclusion of the prior iteration, then perform a corrective rollback, and return to step 2. Else, continue to step 3.2.
Step 3.2. Check if the current increment satisfies the increment threshold. If the increment threshold has been met, the increment-scaling algorithm terminates. Else, continue to step 3.3.
Step 3.3. Determine the starting point for the next iteration. Every winning agent's price vector is set equal to their final bid amount in step 2 less the amount of the current increment. Every nonwinning agent's price vector is set equal to his prior bid amount. Go to step 3.4.
Step 3.4. Scale down the current increment. Scale down the current increment by a factor of ten, and return to step 2.
Combined Algorithm-Increment Scaling with Safe Start
The combined algorithm uses two aspects of the safe-start algorithm. First, it solves for the efficient outcome. Given the efficient outcome, one can set the profitability of all of the bids of nonwinning bidders to zero. As in the safe-start algorithm, all bids of nonwinning bidders will be provided to the system at their valuations. The bids of winning bidders are also provided to the system for round one, such that all bids of a winning bidder have equal profitability (equal to the difference between the valuation of the winning bid and the safe price for that package). Calculating the efficient solution provides one other bit of information to the combined algorithm: it indicates an upper bound on the revenue for the auction and, therefore, a reasonable start for the increment-scaling algorithm. To determine this initial increment, we find the bidder with maximum profitability (valuation-safe price). We determine the order of magnitude of this profitability (k) and we set the initial increment equal to 10 k .
With this information as starting information, we perform the increment-scaling algorithm as described above. This algorithm will terminate when the increment threshold has been met. The entire algorithm is shown below:
Step 1. Solve for the efficient allocation Determine the efficient allocation by solving the winner determination problem using the complete set of agent valuation vectors.
The solution to this problem allows each agent to be categorized as either winning or nonwinning.
Step 2. Initialization step Set the bid increment to a user-specified required accuracy and all valuations are rounded (down) to that accuracy.
Step 3. Determine safe prices Determine the safe price for each package in the efficient allocation by finding the maximal valuation on that package from all nonwinning agents. We call this the safe price of the package, denoted s Ã a . Alternatively, one can obtain a better safe price by calculating the Vickrey price for this winning package.
Step 4. Calculate each agent's initial profitability For each winning agent profitability, calculate p a as the difference between their valuation and the safe price of their winning package, where p a ¼ v a À s Ã a . Every nonwinning agent has an initial profitability of zero.
Step 5. Create initial price vectors Set the price of every other package for this bidder so that the profitability of all packages will be equal to p a . Thus, p i ¼ v i À p a , where i is some nonwinning package of winning bidder a. Each losing bidder's initial price vector is equal to his valuation vector.
Step 6. Initialize the increment scaling ascending proxy auction Set the ''increment threshold'' equal to the user-supplied accuracy specified. Calculate the initial increment (based on the most profitable bidder's profitability).
Step 7. Execute the ascending proxy auction for the increment specified Note that in this combined algorithm, bids are not considered on all packages whose profitabilities fall in the range of the current increment, i.e., no rounding of valuations to the current increment occurs. Instead, package bids are based on the profitability calculated using safe prices and the valuations rounded to the increment threshold.
Step 8. Evaluate the final outcome
Step 8.1. Outcome evaluated for agent overextension. If an agent is winning a bundle in the final outcome at the starting price from the current iteration and that agent was winning at the conclusion of the prior iteration then perform a corrective rollback, and return to step 7.
Step 8.2. Check if the current increment satisfies the increment threshold. If the increment threshold has been met, the increment-scaling algorithm terminates. Else, continue to step 8.3.
Step 8.3. Determine the starting point for the next iteration. Every winning agent's price vector is set equal to their final bid amount less the amount of the current increment. Every nonwinning agent's price vector is set equal to his prior bid amount.
Step 8.4. Scale down the current increment. Scale down the current increment by a factor of ten, and return to step 7. By using the corrective measures and the safe start, the combined algorithm produces an outcome that is buyer Pareto-optimal.
Economic Properties of Near-Direct Implementations
In this section we will show that by using the combined safe-start increment-scaling algorithm, we can achieve all of the desired properties of the Ausubel-Milgrom auction. In addition, when the AAS condition holds but BSM fails, the safe-start incrementscaling algorithm achieves VCG prices.
Specifically, we will show that:
1. The auction ends with an efficient allocation, i.e., the items are awarded to those who value them the most (proposition 17.1).
2. The auction ends with buyer Pareto-optimal payments by winners when the AAS condition holds (proposition 17.2).
3. The auction ends with buyer Pareto-optimal payments in the core even when the BSM property does not hold (proposition 17.3). 4. The auction design has the same properties of not being vulnerable to shill bidding and collusion as the Ausubel-Milgrom proxy auction, because it works off the same premises (proposition 17.4). 5. Our algorithm requires far fewer integer optimizations than a direct application of the ascending proxy auction. We also show that the number of optimizations is bounded by a polynomial in the digits of accuracy required and the number of packages in the optimal allocation (propositions 17.5 and 17.6).
Proposition 17.1 The safe-start increment-scaling algorithm ends with an efficient outcome.
Proof The first step of this algorithm determines the efficient outcome. The next step places all winning bid prices of a winning bidder so that all bids have equal profitability. Thus, the system will consider all bids at every step in the auction. These two features assure that the outcome will be efficient.
Proposition 17.2 The final payoff allocation is in the core.
Proof Because the last winner determination problem solved by the safe-start increment-scaling algorithm included the bids of all of the nonwinning bidders at their valuations, and presented all bids of winning bidders to the system, the auction cannot stop until the winning coalition is unblocked.
Proposition 17.3 The auction ends with prices that are buyer Pareto-dominant, when the AAS condition holds.
Proof All bids of nonwinning bidders are provided to the system with bid prices equal to their valuations. At the last round of the last stage of our algorithm, the winner determination problem considered these bids and determined that they were not part of the winning set. Thus, there are no bids of nonwinning bidders that could compete with the winning bids at the final prices. The algorithm also stops with prices such that if any winning bidder reduced their bid by e (where e is the required accuracy specified by the auction), then the winning set would no longer be winning. In addition, the rollback process assures that the increment size during a given iteration does not force a winning bidder to subsidize other winning bidders. Thus, the prices are Pareto-dominant for the winners. We note that a direct implementation of the Ausubel-Milgrom auction could end with prices that are higher than the Pareto-dominant price when the AAS condition holds but the BSM property does not. One essential difference between the two approaches is that the safe-start increment-scaling algorithm eliminates the interim bargaining that may take place between winning and losing bidders prior to the losing bidders leaving the auction. Example 17.1 shows the results of the safe-start incrementscaling algorithm and that of a direct implementation of the Ausubel-Milgrom auction (labeled ''pure proxy''). The appendix provides other such examples. In all these examples, the packages with the asterisks represent the optimal allocation and the increment used in each case is 0.01. We note that a unique set of Pareto-optimal prices may not exist when the AAS condition does not hold. Example 17.2 illustrates that there can be many such price sets. We present Parkes' threshold payments to illustrate the payments that are weighted toward the VCG Payments. Proposition 17.4 The safe-start increment-scaling implementation does not have vulnerability to shill bidding and collusion by losing bidders, even when items do not satisfy the AAS condition.
Proof This result was proven for the Ausubel-Milgrom framework. Our algorithm has the same characteristics as that of the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction.
Proposition 17.5 The number of optimizations that are required by the safe-start increment-scaling algorithm is:
where d is the number of digits of accuracy required, k is the number of winning bidders, and c is a constant.
Proof To begin the algorithm, one must first solve the winner determination problem considering all bids with their maximum bid amount. The solution to this problem determines (a) an upper bound on the revenue of the problem, and (b) the set of winners that compose the winning set and the size of this set, k. The solution also determines the size of e for the initial stage of the proxy auction. The safe-start increment-scaling algorithm proceeds in stages. In the first stage, one chooses an increment size based on the size of the theoretical maximum profitability of the winning bids. Given the increment size, one can determine the maximum number of steps that this stage would require by examining the number of possible bids that each winning bidder must make to go from the ''safe start'' price to his maximum valuation. Totaling all such steps determines an upper bound on the rounds that occur in this stage. If one finds that the possible number of steps is too large, then one can increase the increment size, knowing that the algorithm might require more rollbacks with a larger beginning increment. After this initial stage, each additional stage provides one additional digit of accuracy, because we reduce the increment at each stage by a factor of ten. Thus, to obtain d additional digits of accuracy from the first increment size, one must perform d stages. Each stage comprises a number of auction rounds. For each round, any bids that are nonwinning and not at their maximum bid amount are raised by the increment size. Because we decrement the size by a factor of ten in each stage, the maximum number of times any bid could be raised in a given stage is ten. And because all bids of nonwinning bidders are at their maximum bid amount, only the winning bidders can change their bids from round to round. Thus, in the worst case, only one bidder is nonwinning in each round and, therefore, in each round, at worst only one bidder must raise all of his bids by the increment. Each such bidder can make such changes at most ten times, resulting in the maximum number of bids made in a stage of k Ã 10. However, because there may be as many as ten rollbacks in a stage (highly unlikely, but a worstcase bound), we increase the number of winner determination problems by a factor of ten to k Ã 10 2 . Thus, the total number of rounds in the staged auction is d Ã k Ã 10 2 and the total number of optimizations performed is ðd Ã k Ã 10 2 Þ þ c, where c denotes the number of winner determination problems that occur in the first round. This number is dependent upon the initial increment and on the number of optimization problems required to compute safe prices for each winning package. We end this section by noting that when the BSM property holds, the prices obtained through the ascending proxy auction are VCG prices that are buyer Paretooptimal in the core. However, there may be prices not in the core that buyers may prefer. In this example, agent 2 cannot win package AB because agent 1 has a higher valuation. The VCG prices are 13 (for package AB won by agent 1) and 4 (for package C won by agent 2). However, if one removes the competition of nonwinning bids of winning bidders from consideration, then the prices would reduce to $10 (for agent 1 on package AB) and remain $4 (for agent 2 on package C). The reason for this reduction is that we have removed the competition of agent 2 from consideration (because agent 2 could never win package AB over agent 1). Notice that this example shows how a winning bidder can have an impact on what another winning bidder will pay for the items won.
Proposition 17.6 The prices obtained can be accurate to whatever precision is needed.
Proof The safe-start increment-scaling algorithm works in stages, refining the winning bid set and the associated second prices. The accuracy required is specified up-front and determines the number of stages of the auction. Each stage of the auction provides one additional digit of accuracy, when the increment factor is set to ten.
Examples from the Literature
This section present results from a few examples found in the literature. Example 17.3 shows results from the example in the Wurman, Zhong, and Cai (2004) paper. We note again that the rules these authors use are slightly different from those used in the . Also, under the column heading ''Rounds,'' we are reporting the number of mixed integer optimizations performed in the Wurman, Zhong, and Cai (2004) method. Because we perform one integer optimization in each round, this is a direct comparison of the number of optimization problems performed by each method. However, one should keep in mind that the structure of the optimization problems we compute are pure set-partitioning problems, whereas the integer optimization problems proposed by Wurman, Zhong, and Cai (2004) are more complicated and likely to be harder to solve. Thus, we provide only a weak comparison of computational effort. (For more on computational complexity of specific set-partitioning structures, see chapter 19 of this volume). We also alert the reader to the fact that a tie exists and there are two solutions with equal revenue of 25.02, namely {1-A, 2-BC} and {1-A, 2-B, 3-C}. In appendix 17.7.1, we present a few additional small test cases. Appendix 17.7.2 shows the results from a collection of ten problems that were generated previously to test linear pricing algorithms. For more information on how these problems were generated, see Dunford et al. 2003 . These cases constitute larger simulations involving six items and ten bidders, and consist of problems that simulate an auction for FCC spectrum licenses where synergies are the natural result of adjacent markets creating additional value to the bidder. In these instances, the auction had a total value between $3.1 and $4.4 million. Figure 17 .1 graphs the number of winner determination problems that have to be solved using each of the proxy algorithms for the ten larger profiles. Note that a logarithmic scale is used. Notice that on these problems, the combined safe-start increment-scaling algorithm often requires more computational effort than the safestart algorithm. This can occur when the safe prices are either equal to or nearly equal to the second prices. Because the increment scaling technique starts with a much larger increment, additional winner determination problems have to be solved until the increment is scaled down to the desired resolution. The additional computational effort is required to prove that the safe prices represent the true second prices. The small examples (cases 17. 4, 17.5, and 17.6) show instances where the safe-start incrementscaling method performs significantly better than the safe start method. In each of these cases, the AAS condition does not hold.
In appendix 17.7.3, we present four profiles provided to us by David Porter. These profiles are based on experiments with human subjects that were designed to test their combinatorial clock auction design (see Porter et al. 2003) . For each of these profiles, three separate experiments were performed. The auction used a 10 percent increment rule-if an item has excess demand in the current round, the price of that item will increase by 10 percent for the next round. One notices that these clock auctions ended in very few rounds, but with prices consistently above the minimal second prices. We conjecture that the reason for this greater revenue is due to the increment size. With smaller increments, the number of rounds required to complete the auction would increase, but the combinatorial clock auction would likely end with prices closer to the minimal second prices.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have described a new algorithm that yields prices having all of the desirable properties of the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction design while significantly reducing the number of integer optimizations required to obtain the desired second prices. The algorithm is easy to implement and allows the auctioneer to obtain payment amounts that are accurate to any desired precision. They provide buyer Pareto-dominant results (VCG payments) whenever the AAS condition holds, even if the BSM condition does not. However, when the AAS condition fails, the allo- cation of the payments among buyers is likely to be different even when each of the implementations arrives at the same total (core) auction revenue.
Direct implementations of the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction and our near-direct proxy algorithm have an added attribute. Assume that the winning bidders expect that their valuations will be kept secret from other participants after the termination of the auction. In addition, assume that the auction has the added requirement that the bidders must be provided with sufficient information to validate that the auction's outcomes were properly determined (i.e., bidders can replicate the results of the auction). The ascending proxy mechanisms and the near-direct implementation described in this paper allow such validation. When these mechanisms are rerun with the winning bidders' highest bid on each package replacing the valuation on the package, the same outcome is obtained. Thus, transparency can be achieved without giving other bidders access to the valuations. Neither the VCG mechanism nor the direct mechanism of Parkes' has this attribute.
In this chapter, we provided limited computational testing. Future testing is required to ascertain how viable this approach is for auctions with a much larger number of items.
We note that all of the designs investigated in this chapter assume that the bidders have complete knowledge of their package valuations at the beginning of the auction; that is, they do not allow for price discovery. Future research could investigate a multistage implementation of the proxy auction that enables bidders to revise their valuations between stages. For more on dynamic proxy auctions, see chapter 5 of this volume. 
Larger Simulations
The increment for this group of larger simulations was set to $1,000. In all cases, the optimal allocation, value, and revenue reported at the top of the results table correspond to the proposed combined safe-start and increment-scaling algorithm. All dollar amounts are in the thousands. 
Comparisons with Clock Mechanism
The following test cases correspond to case 1 from Porter et al. 2003 , where the authors distinguish instances by characterizing ''join'' and ''own'' factors. For further explanation of these factors, please refer to that paper. The increment for the comparisons with the clock mechanism was, where applicable, set to 1. The clock mechanism increased prices by 10 percent per round. In all cases, the optimal allocation, value, and revenue reported at the top of the results table correspond to the proposed combined safe start and increment scaling algorithm.
